Australia’s Defence Strategy

Australia released its first National Defence Strategy (NDS) on 17 April 2024 following the Defence Strategic Review 2023, which mandated the issuance of a biennial NDS. The NDS was accompanied by the Integrated Investment Programme (IIP) 2024 to ensure that funding plans are optimally synchronised with the strategy that includes capability priorities, force posture and structure, defence acquisitions and industry, recruitment, and international engagement. While the NDS highlights Australia’s engagements at the global and regional (Indo-Pacific) levels, it focuses on Australia’s primary area of military interest which covers the Northeast Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific, including northern approaches. The NDS stresses a move to a new concept of national defence, wherein a strategy of denial will be the primary strategic objective. Deterrence is indicated as a subset of this strategy, with other pillars being :(a) prevent coercion (b) support regional security and prosperity and (c) uphold a favourable regional strategic balance. The guiding concept for the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) will shift from a balanced force meant for a range of contingencies to an integrated, focused force designed to address the “most challenging strategic environment since World War II.” Capability priorities and capacity additions have been planned in line with these objectives. Range and lethality have been accorded the highest priority, with a substantial increase in ADF’s ability to operate from northern bases. Deterrence by denial is the strategy of choice for Australia, given that a strategy of deterrence by punishment (while holding a credible threat of retaliation) is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Even when the NDS is implemented in full, the ADF will remain a relatively small force. Further, this denial strategy can only be executed in a strong alliance with the US, and coordination with other alliance partners. Unsurprisingly therefore, AUKUS is a strong component of the strategy, with details on the three phases of the AUKUS submarine pathway (AUKUS pillar 1) as well as a focus on new and disruptive technologies, capabilities, industrial base, and trilateral export license-free environment through this collaboration (AUKUS pillar 2). At the core of the NDS is the concept of collective security, and it highlights that “The defence of Australia lies in the collective security of the Indo-Pacific region.” Cooperation with the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, and New Zealand is also prioritised towards these objectives. With recent bilateral and trilateral security arrangements in the Western Pacific, involving the United States (US), Japan, Australia, the Philippines, the UK and the Republic of Korea, a new alliance framework is rapidly evolving, and the NDS not only connects with this process but accelerates it. The Quad finds a passing mention and India is indicated as a “top-tier security partner.” It implies that while India may not form part of the emerging ‘hard-power deterrence alliance’, its support in other areas and non-obstructionist approach to this framework is valuable. Unlike the US Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022, the NDS avoids direct references to China in an adversarial context and mentions it only from the viewpoint of the larger US-China strategic competition and the Chinese coercive actions in the region. However, the text establishes the causal relationship between China and the rapid deterioration in the security environment in the primary area of military interest for Australia. It is fully aligned with the US strategy in the region, and it is evident that the strategy of denial is targeted primarily at China. The integrated, focused force is designed to deter China, and respond effectively—in partnership—if this deterrence fails. Power projection, sustenance, and lethality will form the backbone of this joint deterrence with the US and other partners. Most of the acquisition plans indicated in the NDS highlight the induction of US platforms and equipment to strengthen interoperability and joint missions. Co-development, co-production and co-sustainment with the US are also stressed in the strategy. The NDS includes the assessment that the US-China dialogue is proving to be useful, particularly in avoiding any miscalculation.  It stresses that Australia will raise issues with China as required, but also pursue a defence dialogue.