New European Political Calculus

The European Parliament (EP) elections concluded on 9 June, with the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) remaining the largest group. However, only a few weeks later, the EP saw the launch of a new group on the horizon. An EP group must fulfil the criteria of at least 23 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) from at least seven EU member states. The far-right Patriots for Europe (PfE) created by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 30 June, which debuted in the EP’s plenary session on 16 July, has managed to grow way past this threshold. Its members now include far-right parties from at least 12 EU countries that have gained popularity through routine exploitation of voter grievances in areas of immigration and increased costs of living in their home states. As it stands, the Patriots for Europe comprises Hungary’s Fidesz party, Portugal’s Chega, Czech Republic’s Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO), Austria’s Freedom Party (FPO), Netherlands Party for Freedom (PVV), Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, Spain’s Vox, Italy’s League, France’s National Rally (RN), Oath and Motorists (Czech Republic), Danish People’s Party, Voice of Reason (Greece), and Latvia First. With most of its members defecting to join the Patriots, the group’s formation has swallowed up the previous right-wing Identity & Democracy (ID) group, which no longer exists. Analysts have pointed out that Patriots are essentially ID with the addition of Fidesz. Yet with its 30 MEPs, RN’s decision to join the Patriots after its losses in France’s snap parliamentary election makes PfE the third largest group in the European Parliament. PfE now holds 84 seats, behind the centre-right EPP (188 seats) and the centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D—136 seats), and has appointed RN’s Jordan Bardella as its president. PfE’s numbers have relegated the other far-right group, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR—78 seats), to third place and French President Emmanuel Macron’s progressive Renew for Europe (77 seats) to fourth place. The PfE’s creation is a personal win for Orbán, who has striven for a unified far-right voice at the EU level, and whose Fidesz party was expelled from the EPP in 2021 due to Hungary’s democratic backsliding and the rule of law disputes with Brussels. The group benefits Orbán on the domestic front too, given the strong performance of his rival Peter Magyar’s Tisza party in the EP elections. In addition, PfE’s formation coincided with the beginning of Hungary’s presidency of the Council of the EU on 1 July with its populist motto of “Make Europe Great Again”. PfE’s manifesto focuses on the regular far-right themes of controlling immigration, opposing Brussels bureaucracy, protecting national sovereignty, preserving European culture and identity, and protecting Christian values. It also emphasises promoting peace in Europe and fighting against the European Green Deal, in line with a patriotic manifesto signed by founding leaders Orbán, ANO’s Andrej Babis (former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic) and FPO’s Herbert Kickl, which promises “peace, security and development instead of the war, migration and stagnation brought by the Brussels elite”. As the EP’s third largest group, the PfE has space to impact the direction of EU policymaking, while steering parliamentary debates towards far-right themes such as immigration. Data from the EU’s border agency Frontex estimates 53,270 irregular migrant arrivals in the first half of 2024. Yet the group has the most chances of causing disruptions and vetoing decisions in the European Council, where countries are represented by national leaders. Currently Orbán, who has long played spoiler on critical EU decisions such as European aid to Ukraine, Sweden’s NATO membership and Kyiv’s EU candidacy, is the group’s only national leader sitting at the Council table. But this number could increase given upcoming national elections in Austria this year and in the Czech Republic in 2025 where far-right populists, whose goals involve hijacking the European project from within, are leading opinion polls. However, despite common opposition towards the Brussels bureaucracy and immigration, the far-right is still spread out across three groups in the EP. Following PfE’s creation, another radical far-right group, dominated by Alternative for Germany (AfD) which was expelled from ID based on its controversial Nazi comments, has been launched. Named Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), the group has 25 MEPs from parties spanning eight member states, including Poland’s Confederation and Bulgaria’s Revival. Internal divergences on critical issues such as Russia-Ukraine pose challenges in adopting a unified voice and wielding collective influence. The decision of Romania’s rightwing Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR) party, with its strong anti-Hungarian stance, to join ECR drove Orbán away from the ECR towards creating his own right-wing formation in the first place. Meloni’s Brothers of Italy and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) continue to remain pro-Ukraine, while several parties in the PfE are pro-Kremlin. Yet even within PfE, Spain’s Vox and Geert Wilders’s PVV have reaffirmed support for Ukraine. In addition, Meloni’s pragmatic and cooperative approach towards Brussels set her ECR group apart from the previous far-right ID. Notwithstanding differences, the three far-right groups—PfE, ECR and ESN—hold 187 seats in the current European Parliament. Despite the centrists retaining power in the EP and the far-right’s unexpected loss in the French legislative election, the latter, once at the fringes of European politics, is now mainstreamed not only through its numbers but also through the propensity of centrist leaders co-opting far-right ideas to prevent a loss of votes. The dilution of the European Green Deal even before the European Parliament elections, and the EU’s migration pact are key examples of this phenomenon. The so-called cordon sanitaire by centrist and other parties to contain the far-right by refusing to work with them may become relaxed, as evident in the EPP’s willingness to cooperate with the ECR. The further mainstreaming and potential acceptance of the far-right in the EP could result in the centre-right moving further right on these issues, thus implicitly influencing a progressive European agenda.